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OSCILLATIONS AND INCOMMENSURABLE 
DECISIONS
On the Multistable Use of Multistable Figures
Christoph F. E. Holzhey1
The children’s book Duck! Rabbit! dramatizes the lesson that just 
because one is right, others don’t have to be wrong.2 An endless dispute 
is quickly settled once the quarrellers experience an aspect change or 
gestalt switch and thereby realize that the same picture can be seen in 
different ways. This simple scenario offers an intriguing model for arbi-
trating between conflicting positions not by approaching them, dissolv-
ing differences or reaching a higher synthesis, but by going back and 
forth between different aspects and thereby realizing that conflicting 
accounts can be equally valid. However, multistable figures like the 
Necker cube, the Rubin vase, or the duck-rabbit can also function in 
quite a different way and problematize the very notion and possibility 
of perception, objectivity, and rational agreement. In Thomas Kuhn’s 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), for instance, multistable 
figures do not stand for the possibility of settling disputes, but have 
rather contributed to a fierce debate about fundamental questions in the 
history and philosophy of science by giving plausibility to the idea that 
science progresses through irreversible, discontinuous shifts. Kuhn him-
self highlights that his particular use of multistable figures differs from 
that in gestalt-shift experiments insofar as ‘the scientist does not pre-
serve the gestalt subject’s freedom to switch back and forth between 
ways of seeing’.3 While one might wonder why he would then deploy 
the gestalt-shift metaphor at all, this article seeks to highlight how 
multistable figures combine different, orthogonal dimensions and move-
ments in such a way that the use of these figures becomes itself multista-
ble. The phenomenon of multistable figures indeed involves aspect 
changes not only between different visual perceptions, but also in rela-
tion to analytical categories such as reversibility and irreversibility, sub-
ject and object, freedom and determinism, epistemology and ontology. 
Like the visual aspects of the figure, these categories appear thoroughly 
intertwined without being confounded, making it possible to mobilize 
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multistable figures to explore them in isolation, but also within a larger 
conceptual space of potential coexistence. 
 Concerning ir/reversibility, in particular, one may note on the one 
hand that what is indeed irreversible is the first appearance of a (new) 
gestalt. Seeing the duck-rabbit image, one initially simply sees a duck or 
a rabbit. Or more precisely – to follow Ludwig Wittgenstein’s concep-
tual discussion of these figures – one initially simply sees a ‘picture-
duck’ or a ‘picture-rabbit’: 
That is to say, if asked ‘What’s that?’ or ‘What do you see here?’ I should 
have replied: ‘A picture-rabbit’. […] I should not have answered the ques-
tion […] by saying: ‘Now I am seeing it as a picture-rabbit’.4 
Only after the first experience of a gestalt switch or of what Wittgen-
stein calls a ‘change of aspect’ (‘Aspektwechsel’) do we speak of seeing-
as and give this experience a time index: ‘Now I am seeing it as …’. 
Henceforth, the perception may oscillate reversibly but the transition 
from seeing to seeing-as remains irreversible.
 On the other hand, if the reversible oscillations have a beginning, 
they may also have an end. There are several ways in which one can 
imagine that the gestalt switches stop just as irreversibly as they started: 
one might forget that an object is a multistable figure, the object could 
change over time, or a particular context may select one of its aspects. 
These suggestions of putting an end to reversible oscillations no doubt 
require isolating some elements in the phenomenology of multistable 
figures while modifying others. Figures of the kind typically used to 
explore multistable perception have the remarkable characteristic that 
the repeated aspect change seems to be partially involuntary. While one 
can voluntarily bring about the change, one cannot permanently fix a 
single aspect – at least once one has knowledge of the reversibility.5 This 
automatism helps convince us that competing descriptions are equally 
justified, and it leads to the expectation that others should agree; but 
the phenomenology of multistable figures is sufficiently rich that one 
can drop the automatism of aspect changes as a defining feature with-
out compromising their metaphoric potential. By cautiously generaliz-
ing them beyond the rather specific domain of the physiology of visual 
sense perception, multistable figures can in fact also provide models for 
taking decisions that are truly free, precisely because there is nothing in 
the object and situation that on a purely cognitive level would deter-
mine a choice between equally possible and valid alternatives. Different 
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kinds of decisions are imaginable here: committing to one aspect at the 
expense of others, but also deciding whether to engage in such a forced 
choice at all rather than suspend the oscillation or move in an alto-
gether different direction. In exploring such distinctions a larger ques-
tion will also come to the fore: To what extent does modelling decisions 
in terms of multistable figures stay bound to an ultimately immaterial 
subjective experience of perception or also allow for the kind of politi-
cal, ethical, and aesthetic import that the metaphor of (scientific) revo-
lution evokes?
I .  T H E  M I N D ’ S  E Y E
The duck-rabbit image entered scientific discourse in 1899, when the 
American psychologist Joseph Jastrow reproduced it, together with 
other multistable figures, in his article ‘The Mind’s Eye’. Despite itself, 
the article already contains some of the different ways in which multi-
stable figures can function. For Jastrow, these ‘illustrations show con-
clusively that seeing is not wholly an objective matter depending upon 
what there is to be seen, but is very considerably a subjective matter, 
depending upon the eye that sees’.6 That such a demonstration is not to 
be understood as a loss of objectivity becomes manifest when the article 
is included in Jastrow’s book Fact and Fable in Psychology, which 
appeared in the same year as Sigmund Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams 
(1900) and sought to separate ‘fact and fable’ in a battle to establish 
‘what is authentically scientific’ against ‘what is but the embodiment of 
unfortunate traditions, or the misguided effort of the dilettante, or the 
perverse fallacy of the prepossessed mystic’.7 Multistable figures here 
help identify and isolate a subjective component of seeing – or what Jas-
trow calls, quoting from Hamlet, the ‘mind’s eye’ – and thereby further 
the cause of scientific objectivity. 
 The basic mechanism is easily understood: multistable figures are 
typically two-dimensional diagrams that are seen as three-dimensional 
objects because ‘we are accustomed to interpret lines, whenever we can, 
as the representations of objects. […] So strong is this tendency to view 
lines as symbols of things, that if there is the slightest chance of so view-
ing them, we invariably do so’ – even if there are several ways of mak-
ing this extrapolation to other dimensions.8 For Jastrow, the diagrams 
eliciting multistable perception thus
 
 C H R I S T O P H  F.  E .  H O L Z H E Y218
illustrate the principle that when the objective features are ambiguous, we 
see one thing or another according to the impression that is in the mind’s 
eye; what the objective factors lack in definiteness the subjective ones sup-
ply, while familiarity, prepossession, as well as other circumstances influ-
ence the result.9 
The different influences here indicated foreshadow a whole research 
programme. Indeed, multistable figures continue to be rewarding 
research objects for the sciences of visual perception to this date.10 They 
provide a privileged avenue for highlighting and isolating the subject’s 
activity in perception and making it amenable to scientific exploration. 
The insights obtained in this way are not limited to the perception of 
multistable figures but extend also to ordinary perception. 
 Jastrow concludes his short essay by shifting from the reversible 
impressions of one observer to the way in which ‘different observers 
derive very different impressions’ from the same ‘objective experience’.11 
However, when he finally moves to spiritualistic séances and other 
examples where ‘the mind’s eye eke[s] out the imperfections of physical 
vision’, it is clear that the lesson drawn from multistable figures is not 
the equal validity of different accounts: ‘The mental predisposition here 
becomes the dominant factor, and the timid see as ghosts what their 
more sturdy companions recognize as whitewashed posts.’12 Indeed, his 
preface reads as if it were written against using multistable figures to 
mediate conflicting accounts: 
These essays take their stand distinctively upon one side of certain issues, 
and as determinately as the situation seems to warrant, antagonize con-
trary positions […]. They further aim to illustrate that misconceptions in 
psychology, as in other realms, are as often the result of bad logic as of 
defective observation.13
Multistable perception thus draws attention to visual perception as a 
double process and allows for a separation of its subjective and objec-
tive components, but it would seem that the reversible seeing of aspects 
can ultimately be relegated to the merely subjective and is to be dis-
missed in favour of what can be ascertained objectively. 
 However, the first section of the essay in question begins with 
another understanding of seeing, emphasizing that it is neither possible 
nor desirable to eliminate the activity of the ‘mind’s eye’: ‘True seeing, 
observing, is a double process, partly objective or outward […] and 
partly subjective or inward’.14 It involves detecting resemblances or 
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what one may call aspect-seeing in reference to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations. Often we need to be told what to look for 
in order to identify resemblances, be it in everyday life or in the science 
lab. The use of microscopes, for instance, must be learned through 
training, which is ‘distinctly aided by consulting the illustrations in the 
text book, for they enable [the] mental eye to realize the pictures which 
it should entertain.’15 There is the risk of being too influenced by what 
one expects to see, but Jastrow takes this problem to be manageable 
through ‘training in correct and accurate vision’, for which ‘it is neces-
sary to acquire an alert mental eye, that observes all that is objectively 
visible, but does not permit the subjective to add to or modify what is 
really present’.16 
 This concludes the essay’s first section, which has not yet addressed 
optical illusions or multistable figures, but only aspect-seeing. Optical 
illusions plausibly help in acquiring an ‘alert mental eye’. As already 
indicated, they also further the project of science and enlightenment by 
facilitating the identification, isolation, objectification, and empirical 
exploration of subjective vision. At the same time, this project ulti-
mately relies on another distribution of seeing, where ‘true seeing’ 
includes ‘subjective seeing’. As Jastrow shifts back and forth between 
these distributions (Fig. 1), the possibility of optical illusions and espe-
cially of multistable figures – where different resemblances alternate and 
compete with each other – becomes more problematic and threatens to 
undermine his scientific project.17 Indeed, optical illusions are arguably 
fundamentally ambiguous in their function: not only do they bifurcate 
into enlightening and mystifying uses, but self-confidently engaging in 
the former also uncannily risks falling prey to the latter, as readers of 
the Romantic fantastic will know. In particular, they function rather dif-
ferently when the outside, third-person perspective onto perception is 
abandoned in favour of an internal, first-person perspective without 
independent recourse to the types and lines of distribution that may 
apply. In the next section, I will briefly pursue the first branch and 
sketch how multistable figures can provide a privileged way to explore 
the multistable dynamic of material systems before then concentrating 
on a more internal perspective that questions the dichotomy between 
subjective and objective seeing without reducing the complexity of see-
ing. 
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Fig. 1. ‘Subjective Seeing’ vs ‘Accurate Vision’.
I I .  M U L T I S T A B L E  S Y S T E M S
The issue of ir/reversibility and im/material decisions is to some extent 
only a question of scale. To speak of a period of reversibility having an 
irreversible beginning and end, means to take irreversibility not in a 
strict, absolute sense, but relative to the frequency of the reversible 
aspect changes. Furthermore, also during the period of reversibility, 
decisions keep being made and maintained for some time until a new 
switch occurs. For cognitive scientists interested in multistable percep-
tion, these decisions correlate with physical processes in the brain, and 
these processes are quite generally those of a multistable system – 
regardless of whether they pertain to the perception of ambiguous fig-
ures, to other mental activities, or the execution of motor actions. 
 In their article ‘Enduring Interest in Perceptual Ambiguity: Alter-
nating Views of Reversible Figures’, Gerald M. Long and Thomas C. 
Toppino propose to organize the large literature of experiments with 
multistable figures by distinguishing whether the focus lies on ‘ambigu-
ity’ or ‘reversibility’.18 In the first case, the primary concern is how the 
visual system solves the ‘ambiguity problem’, that is, the fact that the 
same physical stimulus can produce more than one cognitive interpreta-
tion or percept. Questions that are asked include: which aspect is seen 
first; to what extent can this be influenced by priming the observer 
through instructions or by beginning the experiment with a non-ambig-
uous version of the figure; or, what role do past experience and knowl-
edge of ambiguity play? In experiments focussing on ‘reversibility’, by 
contrast, the basic question of interest is ‘why the system essentially 
“abandons” the perceptual interpretation […] first reached after it has 
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solved the ambiguity problem’.19 Here, one asks, for instance, how long 
are aspects maintained, how does the reversal frequency increase with 
time, to what extent is the increased frequency reset by changing the 
orientation of the object, but also whether the frequency can be 
changed through instructions to fix an aspect, to switch as quickly as 
possible, or to simultaneously perform a completely different cognitive 
task.
 Long and Toppino’s distinction of ambiguity and reversibility seeks 
to account for the enduring competition between contrary ways of 
modelling multistable perception. Another, partially overlapping, way 
to organize the literature on multistable perception is indeed in terms of 
whether passive, sensory, bottom–up processes or active, cognitive, top–
down processes are favoured to account for multistability. Even if both 
types of processes ultimately need to be included for both ambiguity 
and reversibility, it would seem that bottom–up processes – such as the 
interplay of excitatory and fatigue-like processes or of activation and 
satiation processes – play a stronger role for reversibility, while top–
down processes predominate in the resolution of ambiguity. 
 Bottom–up processes especially are no doubt quite sensitive to the 
physiological details of sense perception. However, it would be mislead-
ing to think that cognitive science directly relates top–down processes to 
consciousness or free will. Instead, the brain here is modelled as a com-
plex system and the two types of processes refer to different levels of 
organization, for instance, to ‘whether processing is driven, respectively, 
by lower order or by higher order information’.20 Within such an 
approach, multistable perception turns the brain into a multistable sys-
tem. Yet, the scope of multistability is much broader and need not be 
limited to perception. By design, experiments of multistable perception 
are highly constrained, and what attracts interest is that the same stimu-
lus can lead to different responses and that a decision – a particular res-
olution of ambiguity – is revised after some time even though the exter-
nal stimulus has not changed. However, the perceptual decision can also 
be followed by an action, such as pressing a button to signal what one 
is seeing or, in contexts beyond the science lab, fleeing from the per-
ceived object. In this case, only the resolution of ambiguity would mat-
ter and not reversibility, but the processes are still those of a multistable 
system.21 
 Multistability is a prominent concept in the analysis of complex 
dynamic systems, in particular of non-linear systems with chaotic 
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behaviour. Here, it is not perception, but the material evolution of a sys-
tem that is at issue, and multistability refers to the possibility not of per-
ceiving and describing the same object in different, equally valid and 
justified ways, but of the system having several (relatively) stable config-
urations in which it can settle. That is, the stable states can be identified 
with having different visual experiences, but also with different scenar-
ios of action or different potential realities.22 One might think of the six 
sides of a die, of the thirty-seven grooves in a roulette wheel, or of the 
different ways in which ferromagnetic material ends up being magnet-
ized when cooling down. Indeed phase transitions such as condensation 
or crystallization form a good model for multistability: as the system 
cools down it starts to settle in one of its stable states, and the ‘decision’ 
would be permanent were it not for additional influences such as noise 
or thermal energy that still allows the system to switch between the dif-
ferent possibilities. A more inherently dynamic multistability is charac-
teristic of chaotic, open systems that are sustained by a continuous 
energy flux. Here, one can have what are called ‘strange attractors’ 
towards which the system tends to move without permanently remain-
ing there.23 Such a system moves between several – materially different – 
configurations quite like the multistable figures flip in perception. 
 In this view, multistable perception is only a very special case of 
multistable systems, but one that is privileged insofar as one not only 
observes multistability from the outside, but can also experience it from 
the inside; it is as if one experiences condensation or crystallization as a 
gestalt takes shape, for instance. In other words, multistable figures pro-
vide a hinge connecting third-person observations and first-person expe-
rience: when a subject is presented with an ambiguous figure, its brain 
engages in a particular, well-constrained multistable dynamics, which 
one can imagine exploring and measuring much like that of any other 
multistable system; but in this case, the processes of crystallization and 
of being attracted by multiple strange attractors can also be experienced 
from within. In this constellation, there is multistability in more than 
one dimension: subjective oscillations on a conscious, perceptual level; 
objective oscillations on a material, ‘ontological’ level; and a switching 
back and forth between these two descriptions, that is between first-per-
son and third-person accounts. 
 Before leaving these hints about some possibilities of exploring 
multistability in physical systems, I should emphasize that while model-
ling the brain as a highly complex multi- and metastable system seeks to 
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give a material, causal account of its functioning, my use of models in 
this article is rather different. If multistable figures are said to provide a 
model in domains beyond the visual perception of duck-rabbit images 
and the like, the point is to extend multistability beyond perception and 
use it to think about decision-making or the mutual constitution of sub-
jects and the social order, for instance. However, instead of suggesting a 
material, causal continuity, the idea is to identify homologies on a more 
conceptual or topological level, in particular on the level of temporal 
structures. The approach is in this respect closer to Wittgenstein’s, who 
writes about the experience of ‘noticing an aspect’, through which he 
introduces his interest in multistable figures: ‘Its causes are of interest to 
psychologists. We are interested in the concept and its place among the 
concepts of experience.’24 
I I I .  A S P E C T - S E E I N G  A N D  A H A - E X P E R I E N C E S
One way to understand the multiple, seemingly contradictory uses in 
which multistable figures can be employed is precisely in terms of Witt-
genstein’s analysis of aspect-seeing. The difference between seeing and 
seeing-as is perhaps most dramatically recognized through multistable 
figures, but it is not bound to them. Wittgenstein’s discussion also 
includes suddenly seeing the solution of a puzzle-picture or suddenly 
recognizing an acquaintance that one henceforth sees with the old face 
in the altered one.25 The ‘flashing’ or ‘dawning of an aspect’ is an ele-
ment of, but also logically distinct from, the gestalt switch of multista-
ble figures, and both are different again from ‘the “continuous seeing” 
of an aspect’.26 One could say that the dawning of an aspect involves a 
movement in a direction orthogonal to the reversible oscillation 
between different aspects, figures, or gestalten – a direction that may be 
considered vertical in contradistinction to the horizontal movement 
between equally valid and valued aspects or figures. It is with this verti-
cal direction that an irreversible temporality may be associated. If a 
gestalt was already seen before, a gestalt switch is induced on a horizon-
tal level, but what is more fundamentally at stake is a vertical transition 
from seeing to seeing-as, that is, the dawning of an aspect – such as the 
emergence of a picture-duck from a line drawing that was previously 
seen only as a picture-rabbit (Fig. 2).
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Fig. 2. Aha-Experience: Dawning of a (New) Aspect.
One may think of such a dawning of an aspect as a eureka moment or 
an aha-experience, and thereby not only underline the irreversibility of 
a sudden insight resolving a previously obscure situation, but also situ-
ate it beyond a solely cognitive register within a field of pleasurable 
experience, which tends towards exclamation. From such an ‘Aha-
Erlebnis, which Köhler considers to express […] an essential moment in 
the act of intelligence’,27 Jacques Lacan famously constructs a decisive 
‘stage’ in and for the development of infants – ‘the striking spectacle of 
a nursling in front of a mirror’.28 The comical contrast that Lacan cre-
ates between the infant’s ‘motor impotence’ and ‘jubilant activity’ tar-
gets the perceptual integration of fragments into a gestalt less than the 
instauration of a directed, irreversible temporality in the infant. Accord-
ing to Lacan, the ‘jubilant assumption [assomption] of his specular 
image […] seems […] to manifest in an exemplary situation the sym-
bolic matrix in which the I is precipitated in a primordial form’: 
This form situates the agency known as the ego, prior to its social determi-
nation, in a fictional direction that will forever remain irreducible for any 
single individual or, rather, that will only asymptotically approach the sub-
ject’s becoming […]. For the total form of his body, by which the subject 
anticipates the maturation of his power in a mirage, is given to him only as 
a gestalt […] [T]his gestalt – whose power [prégnance] should be consid-
ered linked to the species […] – symbolizes the I’s mental permanence, at 
the same time as it prefigures its alienating destination.29
One could say that the gestalt as which the infant sees itself is a poten-
tial, but unattainable future with respect to which the subject will 
always be seen as deficient and fragmented. By seeing itself as gestalt, 
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the subject enters a directed, irreversible temporality that simultane-
ously produces fantasies of totality and fragmentation, the former in 
anticipation and the latter retroactively: 
The mirror stage is a drama whose internal pressure pushes precipitously 
from insufficiency to anticipation – and, for the subject caught up in the 
lure of spatial identification, turns out fantasies that proceed from a frag-
mented image of the body to what I will call an ‘orthopedic’ form of its 
totality – and to the finally donned armor of an alienating identity that 
will mark his entire mental development with its rigid structure.30 
It is not necessary to accept all the empirical, psychological evidence 
adduced by Lacan,31 nor his psychoanalytic framework, in order to rec-
ognize in the strong temporal directionality of the aha-experience one 
avenue in which aspect-seeing is not limited to the psychology of visual 
perception or subjective experience, but can be a powerful element in 
models of behaviour and action in a larger sense. If a future is what is 
seen in a gestalt, what is at stake is not its factual accuracy, but the suc-
cess or failure in realizing a different world. In other words, a performa-
tive dimension of aspect-seeing comes here to the fore, which becomes 
political or ethical once there is a choice between different formative 
forms or constituting gestalten.
 This brings us back to multistable figures and to the suggestion 
that their gestalt switches combine two orthogonal movements. The 
first experience of an aspect change could be said to produce a double 
aha-experience. Seeing the dawning of a new aspect repeats the vertical 
movement from a meaningless line drawing to a gestalt. At the same 
time, the horizontal switch from one gestalt to another not only 
involves the disappearance of a gestalt, but also destroys the self-evi-
dence of the gestalt.32 Henceforth, we can no longer say that we simply 
see a picture-rabbit, but only that we now see the image as a picture-
rabbit. In addition to the aha-experience of seeing a new aspect, there is 
thus also the more ambivalent aha-experience linked to the recognition 
that seeing (a picture-rabbit) was always already a seeing-as – at least 
ever since a first recognition that has meanwhile been forgotten. 
 We might say that multistable figures repeat the mirror stage and 
turn it into its opposite: if the jubilant assumption of the mirror image 
involves not only the promise of a future integrity, but also retroactive 
fantasies of fragmentation, the experience of an aspect change leads to a 
doubling or fragmentation of the image and to retroactive fantasies of a 
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self-evident integrity henceforth lost. With a different emphasis, this loss 
of self-evidence could also be seen as a liberation from the grasp of a 
particular constituting gestalt. In some contexts, this may provide a 
metaphor for choosing between different forms of the future to be 
achieved rather than already actualized, where each form may be con-
sidered as equally whole and justified by the present. If any such choice 
re-engages in the (relatively) irreversible identification with formative 
forms, yet another emphasis may highlight the fascination of reversible 
gestalt shifts, which recalls the fort-da game that Freud analyzes in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle and that Lacan links to the human entry 
into the symbolic order of language. By combining movements in 
orthogonal directions, multistable figures allow for a repeated experi-
ence of the dawning of aspects along a vertical axis (Fig. 3). They 
thereby keep reproducing the aha-experience that is otherwise destined 
to fade, precisely because it is irresistibly irreversible and leads to a con-
flation of seeing and seeing-as such that seeing-as is mistaken for see-
ing.33 
Fig. 3. Repeated Aha-Experiences.
I V .  A S P E C T - B L I N D N E S S 
Wittgenstein highlights the logical separation and complex intertwining 
of the phenomena of aspect-seeing and aspect-changes by imagining a 
curious condition of ‘aspect-blindness’. He introduces it with the ques-
tions: ‘Could there be human beings lacking in the capacity to see some-
thing as something – and what would that be like? What sort of conse-
quences would it have?’ This manner of asking is characteristic of Witt-
genstein’s conceptual investigation that seeks to understand what subtly 
different modes of experience would ‘be like’ while insisting on conse-
quences in communication and action rather than succumbing to specu-
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lations about psychological causation or the ineffable solipsism of first-
person experience. He immediately clarifies his definition of aspect-
blindness with two specifications. On the one hand, the ‘aspect-blind 
man is supposed not to see the aspects A change’.34 On the other hand, 
the aspect-blind would nonetheless see the different aspects of multista-
ble figures: that is, when shown a set of figures and asked to identify the 
figure of a duck, they could point to a duck-rabbit figure, but they 
would not say that they now see it as a duck.35 One can thus conclude 
that when seeing the duck-rabbit figure, the aspect-blind might at times 
see a picture-rabbit and at other times a picture-duck, but they would 
neither see the switch from one to the other, nor, for that matter, the 
dawning of an aspect. They see aspects but do not see them as aspects: 
they simply see them (Fig. 4). 
Fig. 4. Aspect-Blindness.
Wittgenstein quickly extends the hypothetical condition of aspect-blind-
ness to ‘the lack of a “musical ear”’ and to ‘the connexion between the 
concepts of “seeing an aspect” and “experiencing the meaning of a 
word”’.36 The peculiar notion of aspect-blindness and meaning-blind-
ness arguably has a profound role for his late thinking and understand-
ing of how human beings can have meaningful experiences and acquire 
language, and accounts perhaps for his interest in multistable figures in 
the first place.37 
 In my reading, aspect-blindness is also a central issue in Kuhn’s 
mobilization of multistable figures in The Structure of Scientific Revolu-
tions. As Ian Hacking observes, Kuhn’s book succeeded in producing a 
‘decisive transformation’ in the image of science and ‘unintentionally 
inspired a crisis of rationality’.38 Hacking notes that the thought of sci-
entific revolution is quite old and that even the idea of perpetual revolu-
tion suggested by Kuhn would not make scientific development irra-
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tional.39 Nor does the idea that science operates with what Kuhn calls 
‘paradigms’ and that it switches between them during revolutions ques-
tion scientific rationality. Little does it matter here on which of the two 
principal meanings of the notoriously diffuse notion of ‘paradigm’ one 
focuses: on ‘paradigm-as-achievement’, that is, on an exemplary solu-
tion to a problem that serves as a model for approaching other prob-
lems, or on ‘paradigm-as-set-of-shared-values’, that is, on a ‘shared set 
of methods, standards, and basic assumptions’ within scientific commu-
nities.40 Rather, Hacking asserts that the ‘threat to rationality comes 
chiefly from Kuhn’s conception of revolutionary shift in paradigms’ in 
terms of a comparison ‘to religious conversion, and to the phenomenon 
of a gestalt-switch’.41 In other words, the threat comes from exposing 
aspect-blindness in the traditional image of scientific progress. 
 To determine the precise relationship between paradigm shifts and 
gestalt switches is as tricky as the distinction between seeing and seeing-
as or the notion of aspect-blindness. When Kuhn speaks of revolutions 
as ‘changes of world view’, he is not merely using a visual metaphor for 
paradigm shifts in the sense of a change in values, methods, and basic 
assumptions. Instead, a scientific revolution involves quite literally a 
‘perceptual switch’ that is linked to a paradigm change without being 
identical to it. Early in the chapter ‘Revolutions as Changes of World 
View’, Kuhn writes, for instance: ‘Led by a new paradigm, scientists 
adopt new instruments and look in new places’, but then he immedi-
ately adds: 
Even more important, during revolutions scientists see new and different 
things when looking with familiar instruments in places they have looked 
before. It is rather as if the professional community had been suddenly 
transported to another planet where familiar objects are seen in a different 
light and are joined by unfamiliar ones as well. Of course, nothing of quite 
that sort does occur […]. Nevertheless, paradigm changes do cause scien-
tists to see the world of their research-engagement differently. […] It is as 
elementary prototypes for these transformations of the scientist’s world 
that the familiar demonstrations of a switch in visual gestalt prove so sug-
gestive. What were ducks in the scientist’s world before the revolution are 
rabbits afterwards.42 
As ‘elementary prototype’ the gestalt switch phenomenon here appears 
quite explicitly as a paradigm – in the sense of an exemplary model – 
for paradigm shifts. At the same time, Kuhn continues to insist on the 
‘shifts of vision’ or ‘perceptual switches’ that can accompany paradigm 
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changes without registering with scientists: ‘if perceptual switches 
accompany paradigm changes, we may not expect scientists to attest to 
these changes directly’ (p. 115). Understanding the blindness – or at 
least the indifference – towards shifts in vision is among Kuhn’s major 
concerns, and interestingly he offers explanations going in opposite 
directions. On the one hand, he seems to blame scientists and their his-
torians for disguising perceptual switches by rewriting the past with a 
‘persistent tendency to make the history of science look linear or cumu-
lative’ (p. 138). Questioning the image of science as an ‘enterprise’ that 
would ‘move steadily ahead in ways that, say, art, political theory, or 
philosophy does not’ (p. 159), he approaches the natural sciences to 
other disciplines characterized by contingent historicity rather than nec-
essary, cumulative progress. On the other hand, Kuhn also seems to 
affirm the particular status and irreversible evolution of science by high-
lighting that the ‘parallel’ between scientific revolutions and gestalt 
shifts ‘can be misleading’: ‘Scientists do not see something as something 
else; instead, they simply see it. […] In addition, the scientist does not 
preserve the gestalt subject’s freedom to switch back and forth between 
ways of seeing’ (p. 85). It would seem here that scientists are necessarily 
or by definition aspect-blind.
 In the remainder of this article, I will successively explore these two 
approaches towards science’s aspect-blindness and argue that they are 
orthogonal rather than opposed. In the first case, the issue is foremost a 
horizontal movement that is stabilized through an additional upward 
direction but can be mobilized again through the notion of incommen-
surability. In the second case, a downward, reductive movement to a 
common material basis underlying the horizontal shifts predominates. I 
will conclude by indicating how a notion of complementarity may ques-
tion these ways out of reversible shifts between incommensurable posi-
tions. It should be noted that this close engagement with Kuhn’s highly 
influential and much debated text is not concerned with re-evaluating 
its general framework, nor with taking a position on its applicability to 
the historiography of science. My main aim is rather to explore how 
multistable figures intertwine orthogonal movements of different tem-
poralities and allow for multiple – or indeed multistable – forms of 
analysis and intervention, and thereby enlarge the space of conceivable 
kinds of decision. 
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V .  S T A B I L I Z E D  A S P E C T S 
One way to illustrate Wittgenstein’s peculiar notion of aspect-blindness, 
which imagines the possibility of seeing different aspects without seeing 
them switch or seeing them as aspects, may be in terms of the antelope-
bird figures in Fig. 5: looking at the two pictures we may well be blind 
to the fact that it is the same figure that we are seeing in one picture as 
a bird and in the other as an antelope.43 In order to recognize this, we 
have to abstract from the context and concentrate on the single figure in 
the lower right-hand corner. The context that stabilizes an aspect and 
impedes aspect changes can also be formed by memory and expectation. 
In Fig. 6, for instance, we are likely to see the central figures just as a 
man’s face when coming from the left and just as a kneeling woman 
when coming from the right. Combining both effects, we can imagine 
the scenario of coming from a world of antelopes, looking at the right-
hand picture in Fig 5, and seeing at first an antelope surrounded by 
strange creatures until we suddenly recognize them all to be birds. The 
switch may be as sudden and as involuntary as during the repeated 
aspect changes of multistable figures, but it will be an irreversible 
switch that leads to the sense of seeing properly rather than of aspect-
seeing. In other words, aspect-blindness here appears as the result of 
adding a fitting context to a figure that in isolation would elicit multi-
stable perception. 
Fig. 5. Antelope-Bird.
Fig. 6. Perceptual Hysteresis.
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Highlighting the role of context, Norwood R. Hanson’s Patterns of Dis-
covery (1958) discusses the antelope-bird picture and some other multi-
stable figures in order to argue for a sense ‘in which seeing is a “theory-
laden” undertaking’.44 Referring to the same picture, Kuhn credits Han-
son for making the parallel between paradigm change and gestalt switch 
(p. 85). Without equating it with ‘theory’, his notion of ‘paradigm’ can 
indeed be thought of as providing the context that stabilizes aspects, 
keeps them from oscillating reversibly, and makes them imperceptible as 
aspects. If ‘something like a paradigm is prerequisite to perception 
itself’ (p. 113) and if perception must be learned through training 
within a paradigm, as Kuhn asserts as if to recast the somewhat mis-
leading notion of ‘theory-laden seeing’,45 a paradigm can indeed be 
expected to produce hysteresis and aspect-blindness. Referring to Fig. 2 
for aha-experiences, one could say that the process of training percep-
tion involves moving in a vertical direction from lines to gestalt, but it 
does so in slow motion in a particular context (paradigm) that helps 
identify and select a particular gestalt. As a result, to change world 
views in a ‘horizontal’ direction is neither as fast nor as reversible as it 
is in gestalt experiments, but it happens with a certain inertia, requiring 
unlearning and re-learning within a new context or paradigm. This is 
not to say that everything happens in a continuous fashion and that 
there are not also the kind of sudden, global shifts that one associates 
with aspect changes. Rather, the point is that longer periods of confu-
sion and puzzlement precede the sudden moments of (re)cognition that 
happen with some delay. In other words, as in the hysteresis example, 
the slow, mostly horizontal (un)learning process is punctuated by sud-
den aha-experiences. 
 As Kuhn notes a couple of decades after writing The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions, his use of the gestalt switch metaphor came fore-
most from the congruence between his own aha-experiences as a histo-
rian and those reported by scientists. While he is now especially con-
cerned with the ‘transfer of terms like “gestalt switch” from individuals 
to groups’ and the ‘clearly metaphorical’ and ‘damaging’ character of 
this operation, I would like to highlight his close alignment of aha-expe-
riences and gestalt switches: 
For the historian, the period of wrestling with nonsense passages in out-of-
date texts is ordinarily marked by episodes in which the sudden recovery 
of a long-forgotten way to use some still-familiar terms brings new under-
standing and coherence. In the sciences, similar ‘aha experiences’ mark the 
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periods of frustration and puzzlement that ordinarily precede fundamental 
innovation and that often precede the understanding of innovation as well. 
The testimony of scientists to such experiences, together with my own 
experience as a historian, was the basis for my repeated reference to gestalt 
switches, conversion experiences, and the like.46
The emphasis is on the moment of an irreversible aha-experience when 
the gestalt of a solution suddenly appears in an obscure, puzzling situa-
tion or when an old text suddenly makes sense. However, this moment 
is also closely associated not only with conversion experiences but also 
with presumably reversible ‘gestalt switches’. At least for the historian, 
this is indeed quite plausible and one can see how the two orthogonal 
movements and their temporalities separate: the historian’s sudden 
understanding rests on seeing ‘some still-familiar terms’ under a new – 
or rather, long-forgotten – aspect; although the historian will henceforth 
know how to read older texts, there is no reason that she should forget 
or abandon current ways of using familiar terms. That is, with some 
practice she can switch back and forth between different usages of 
terms, and despite the irreversible aha-experience of understanding 
older texts she may continue to prefer the modern usages of the same 
terms.
 For the scientist involved in a scientific revolution, the process of 
discovery is reversed and also different: it is not that another use of 
terms has been forgotten, but rather that it does not yet exist. Accord-
ing to Kuhn, a paradigm starts as a ‘promise of success discoverable in 
selected and still incomplete examples. Normal science consists in the 
actualization of that promise’ (p. 24). When the promise is frustrated 
through the encounter of anomalies this can lead to a crisis that cannot 
be solved within the ‘normal science’ of puzzle-solving, but instead 
requires a larger, abrupt re-arrangement: 
anomalies and […] crises […] are terminated, not by deliberation and 
interpretation, but by a relatively sudden and unstructured event like the 
gestalt switch. Scientists then often speak of the ‘scales falling from the 
eyes’ or of the ‘lightning flash’ that ‘inundates’ a previously obscure puz-
zle, enabling its components to be seen in a new way that for the first time 
permits its solution (p. 122).
The emphasis here lies again on an irreversible aha-experience, but the 
two movements remain intertwined: when the same components are 
‘seen in a new way’, they undergo a gestalt switch that is horizontal and 
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reversible on the level of the individual components (just like the iso-
lated antelope-bird picture would be). The bias for one aspect happens 
on another level, namely through the solution it permits for the previ-
ously puzzling relationship among the components. If the first appear-
ance of an aspect shift in a multistable figure involves a double aha-
experience – where a new gestalt appears for the same components, 
which turns the initial seeing into a reversible seeing-as – here we have a 
triple one; but the additional aha-experience – where, when seen under 
the new aspect, the components form part of a solution – dominates the 
situation and stabilizes it (Fig. 7). For the scientists intuiting the solu-
tion, the process may therefore well be an irreversible ‘conversion’. No 
doubt, they may attest to a change of perception that can be understood 
as the dawning of an aspect. However, speaking of ‘scales falling from 
the eyes’ or of a ‘lightning flash’ illuminating a previously obscure puz-
zle is also consistent with aspect-blindness, insofar as a dramatic sense 
of progress invalidates earlier perception such that it no longer seems 
possible to see as one used to see. Kuhn indeed takes statements of con-
version as ultimately serving to ‘disguise a shift of scientific vision’, for 
instance when the ‘convert to Copernicanism’ says: ‘I once took the 
moon to be (or saw the moon as) a planet, but I was mistaken’ (p. 115).
Fig. 7. Aha-experience: Solving a Puzzle.
V I .  D E C I S I O N S  U N D E R  C O N D I T I O N  O F 
I N C O M M E N S U R A B I L I T Y
To speak of aspect-blindness when new ways of seeing entirely displace 
earlier ones, helps to put pressure on the assumption of irreversible cog-
nitive progress. Although such a shift may impose itself on account of 
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the solutions it allows for a previously obscure puzzle, the solution may 
only be local: requiring a different use of components, it compromises 
what the previous paradigm had achieved in other domains. If para-
digm B offers a solution to puzzle B facing paradigm A, it undoes the 
solution to puzzle A that was the basis for paradigm A (Fig. 8.) If this is 
the case, the new insight does not participate in a cumulative progress 
of knowledge, but rather marks the beginning of the kind of process 
that Kuhn analyses as a revolution. 
Fig. 8. Incommensurability – Local Solutions.
Kuhn explicitly models scientific revolutions upon political revolutions 
and conversion experiences (pp. 92–94, pp. 149–50). The parallels lie 
not only in the necessary leap that ‘must occur all at once […] or not at 
all’ (p. 149), but also in the absence of a rational procedure and justifi-
cation for the transition. During political revolutions, ‘political recourse 
fails’ and ‘the techniques of mass persuasion, often including force’ are 
the only options once society is polarized and divided into competing 
camps that disagree about the framework of political institutions and 
the very rules of politics (pp. 93–94). Kuhn theorizes scientific revolu-
tions in a similar vein. Here, the ‘evaluative procedures characteristic of 
normal science’ simply do not apply, as they partially depend on a par-
ticular paradigm, making all argument necessarily circular (p. 94). The 
‘competition between paradigms is not the sort of battle that can be 
resolved by proofs’ (p. 147), which is not to say that arguments are 
wrong or irrelevant (p. 151), but rather that one must recognize that the 
‘claim to have solved the crisis-provoking problem is […] rarely suffi-
cient by itself’ (p. 153). Circumstances during scientific revolutions are 
such that the ‘decision between alternate ways of practicing science […] 
must be based less on past achievement than on future promise’ (p. 156) 
and can ultimately only be made ‘on faith’ (p. 157).
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 This central point may be conceptualized by considering pre- and 
post-revolutionary paradigm-based practices as what Kuhn calls 
‘incommensurable’, that is, as having no common measure that would 
allow for a comparison establishing the superiority of one paradigm 
over the other. ‘Proponents of competing paradigms […] fail to make 
complete contact with each other’s viewpoints’ because they disagree 
over the problems to be solved, over their standards or definitions of 
science, and over their use of similar terms and concepts (p. 147). In 
short, they have different world views and may be said to ‘practice their 
trade in different worlds’ (p. 149). 
 One of the reasons that the thesis of incommensurable paradigms 
has been much contested is that it would seem to make the course of 
science appear as necessarily irrational, that is, as incapable of being 
based on rational choices. The issue is not merely that one has to allow 
for error, deceit, and extra-scientific contingencies that obstruct the pro-
gress of science; rather, it is the very possibility of correcting errors and 
thus making scientific knowledge progress in a cumulative, asymptotic 
manner that is in question. At the same time, one could also say that the 
scenario of interlocutors disagreeing on whether they are seeing a duck 
or a rabbit offers a model not only for incommensurability, but also for 
dealing rationally with irrationality: if incommensurability makes a 
rational decision in favour of one gestalt over another impossible, the 
rational thing to do is to settle the dispute by accepting, at least provi-
sionally, both of them as equally valid and justified. However, such a 
conclusion seems difficult to accept, and especially – but not only – in 
science the tendency is rather to reject at least one alternative as mis-
taken. 
 Experience with multistable figures may help to ward off the temp-
tation to rush from an initial success to the elimination of alternatives, 
rather than recognize the adoption of a paradigm as a choice that may 
have to be revised or that is constitutive of a particular (sub)discipline 
that can coexist with others. The thesis of incommensurability does not 
discredit paradigm-constituting achievements – either past or promised 
for the future – but it does relativize them; it challenges the seemingly 
self-evident irreversibility of the third aha-experience and restores 
reversibility to the horizontal gestalt switches of the puzzle’s compo-
nents. It thereby makes the adoption of a paradigm recognizable as a 
matter of choice, that is, as a decision that interrupts a potentially end-
less reversal of aspects corresponding to incommensurable paradigms. 
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In fact, thinking of the reversibility of multistable figures, incommensu-
rability can be seen as the condition for a scientific decision that is truly 
free insofar as it is not determined by scientific knowledge: with either 
alternative being equally consistent within the currently available 
knowledge, multifaceted personal contingencies and aesthetic factors 
can play a role in decision-making, as can political and economic con-
siderations raising ethical questions, especially when it is a question of 
which problems and which solutions are considered more pressing and 
relevant. 
 At the same time as providing a condition for a free decision, 
multistability arguably also demands a decision for there to be a praxis. 
This need not be taken as a normative claim favouring the establish-
ment of ‘normal science’, but could rather be used to define paradigms 
as the context that is at least implied when engaging in a praxis. How-
ever, insofar as the praxis persists, the ultimately contingent and per-
haps also unwitting decision will stabilize itself and become irreversible 
because it will involve further changes in perception and conceptualiza-
tion. And within a growing community of followers initiated in a par-
ticular way of seeing and thinking, alternatives may well be excluded or 
simply forgotten. 
 Kuhn suggests that the sciences are perhaps ‘unique among creative 
disciplines in the extent to which they cut themselves off from their 
past’.47 More precisely, they reconstruct the work of their predecessors 
in terms of current ways of seeing and conceptualizing, thereby generat-
ing an image of cumulative scientific development that misrepresents 
the past. Historical, interdisciplinary, and intercultural analyses here 
have a critical potential in questioning ideologies of teleological pro-
gress by re-opening possibilities and revisiting choices that can only be 
recognized and evaluated as such when a situation of multistable revers-
ibility between different alternatives is reconstructed. In other words, 
they can offset aspect-blindness, which all-too-easily grows with tradi-
tion, differentiation, and specialization, and which envelops what is 
seen with a sense of brute facticity and necessity without historicity and 
contingency. Re-activating reversible aspect changes between incom-
mensurable alternatives counters aspect-blindness without necessarily 
objecting to the decisions that were taken, let alone to the fact that a 
decision was taken. Instead, the critical intervention lies in making deci-
sions recognizable as decisions, that is, in making them accountable and 
susceptible to revaluation.
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V I I .  O R T H O G O N A L  S H I F T S  A N D  C O M P L E M E N T A R I T Y
When the sciences are claimed to undergo revolutions that are con-
ceived in terms of shifts between incommensurable alternatives, they 
lose their privileged status of being a model for linear, teleological pro-
gress. Their dynamic appears to be just as subject to historicity and con-
tingency as that of other social and cultural systems in which the impor-
tance of rhetoric, politics, and aesthetics is more apparent. Yet, Kuhn, 
whose name is readily associated with such a demystification of scien-
tific progress, does not quite exclude the possibility of progress, and 
ultimately reasserts a specificity of science in this respect. His final 
chapter, ‘Progress Through Revolutions’, highlights that scientific pro-
ductivity comes from ‘very special communities’ and is mostly ‘a prod-
uct of Europe in the last four centuries’ (p. 167). He observes that 
within such communities oriented towards ‘normal science’ the percep-
tion of progress even across revolutions ‘is, in an important respect, 
self-fulfilling’ (p. 168). However, his intervention lies not here but in 
rejecting a teleological view of science progressing towards a goal – 
such as approaching ‘a permanent fixed scientific truth’ (p. 172) – in 
favour of a ‘process of evolution from primitive beginnings’ (p. 169) 
‘marked by an increase in articulation and specialization’ (p. 171). The 
difference between rejecting only teleology and rejecting progress as 
such, arguably maps onto the different lessons that the history of sci-
ence and science studies drew from Kuhn’s work.48 Although Kuhn 
seems to clarify his position in this respect in the final chapter, multista-
ble figures may help to think through an ambiguity that remains and 
pertains also to the notion of incommensurability. 
 Kuhn’s account of why scientists cannot be expected to attest 
directly to perceptual switches accompanying paradigm changes indeed 
goes beyond what could be understood as a critique of an ideology of 
scientific progress or of a continuous rewriting of history from the win-
ner’s perspective. He suggests that it is not only due to hindsight or to 
an unwillingness to un-learn and re-learn ways of seeing that the sci-
ences are effectively aspect-blind and can at best recognize corrections 
in perception and conceptualization, but not reversible aspect changes. 
Referring to Fig. 4, the issue is also that the vertical dimension implied 
in a gestalt switch is not fully available in scientific observation. Kuhn’s 
account for how the multistable figures in gestalt experiments differ 
from scientific observation is worth quoting at some length because it 
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not only makes the recognition of a (horizontal) aspect change depend-
ent upon an orthogonal movement, but interestingly also highlights the 
process of learning not to see a gestalt or figure: 
The subject of a gestalt demonstration knows that his perception has 
shifted because he can make it shift back and forth repeatedly while he 
holds the same book or piece of paper in his hands. Aware that nothing in 
his environment has changed, he directs his attention increasingly not to 
the figure (duck or rabbit) but to the lines on the paper he is looking at. 
Ultimately he may even learn to see those lines without seeing either of the 
figures, and he may then say (what he could not legitimately have said ear-
lier) that it is these lines that he really sees but that he sees them alternately 
as a duck and as a rabbit (p. 114).49 
Once again, we here have a description of a double movement in multi-
stable figures: on the one hand, the reversible gestalt shift between the 
two figures, and on the other hand, the movement between seeing and 
seeing-as or between seeing lines and figure (Fig. 9). I have sought to 
suggest that these two movements correspond to the different ways in 
which multistable figures can function metaphorically: the latter, verti-
cal movement lies at the core of multistability as a metaphor for an irre-
versible, revolutionary temporality. It is orthogonal to the first and 
involves the emergence or destruction of a gestalt, rather than a reversi-
ble shift between figures. 
Fig. 9 Double Movement.
Kuhn continues by arguing that ‘[w]ith scientific observation, however, 
the situation is exactly reversed. The scientist can have no recourse 
above or beyond what he sees with his eyes and instruments’ (p. 114). 
That is, as he remarked before: ‘Scientists do not see something as 
something else; instead, they simply see it.’ This does not mean that 
they see reality as it is, but on the contrary that they are limited to what 
they see and therefore cannot say that it is some underlying object that 
they ‘really see’ while seeing it alternately as one thing or another. It 
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would seem that scientists are necessarily aspect-blind: they cannot 
know that their perception has shifted if by this we mean that the same 
object is seen in different ways, for this would require that the identity 
of the object be ascertained in the first place. In other words, the change 
of perception during a scientific revolution has some resemblance with 
the horizontal gestalt switch of multistable figures, but it is generally 
unclear to what extent the change is due to a switch in perception or to 
other changes, such as looking elsewhere with other methods and differ-
ent concepts. It is only if one can reversibly move back and forth with-
out changing anything else in one’s ‘environment’ that one can imagine 
settling disagreement between different perceptions and descriptions by 
resorting to the model of multistable figures. This seems to lead to the 
paradox that multistable figures provide a model for the undecidability 
between incommensurable paradigms only when one can affirm a com-
mon measure: that is, only once one has ascertained the identity of the 
underlying object. 
 The paradox can be resolved in different ways.50 One could, for 
instance, limit incommensurability to the higher level of approaches, 
questions, and selective attention – that is, to an epistemological level – 
and distinguish it from an independently existing ontological level that 
provides a common measure for all perception. Such a (realist) view 
guarantees the possibility of progress while also allowing for incom-
mensurability as long as understanding is not complete. However, what 
is ultimately misleading about the parallel of gestalt demonstrations and 
scientific observation is perhaps not so much the conflation of paradigm 
and accompanying perception, but rather the idea that perception 
involves the interpretation of some raw data and that one could gener-
ally resolve conflicting perceptions and descriptions by referring them to 
a raw perception that could be neutrally described so as to either cor-
rect the interpretations or accept them as equally justified. 
 Starting not with an object but with conflicting accounts, it may in 
most cases remain an open question as to whether the model of multi-
stable figures is at all applicable. Nevertheless, allowing for this possi-
bility carries a productive and critical potential that is missed by the 
assumption that a decision for one of the gestalten must be taken in the 
expectation that the solution it promises can be actualized. Kuhn’s point 
about highlighting the difference between scientific observation and 
gestalt experiments was certainly not to rule out the possibility of iden-
tifying a common underlying object for scientific observation, but 
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rather that with such an identification the aspect changes would become 
a psychological problem of sense perception while the original scientific 
interest would now be directed at this underlying object (p. 114). That 
is, if competing aspects can be recognized as forming a multistable fig-
ure in this manner, the crisis would already be solved through a para-
digm change in a direction orthogonal to that of the changing aspects. 
 What may seem odd here is that although the recognition of a com-
mon underlying object can well be imagined to produce an aha-experi-
ence and to proceed in a vertical direction orthogonal to the competing 
aspects, the shift appears to involve the (partial) destruction of a gestalt, 
rather than its emergence. That is, it proceeds in a downward direction 
from which a negative aha-experience – a disillusion or demystification 
– could be expected, rather than the shift to a new gestalt. With scien-
tific observation, the situation is thus indeed exactly reversed with 
respect to gestalt-switch experiments. At the same time, the disintegra-
tion of gestalten into its components also coheres well with a reduction-
ist scientific programme aiming at a unified world view with ever more 
elementary constituents and interactions. This double reversal points to 
what may be a better way of thinking about the relationship between 
seeing and aspect-seeing: after all, why not say, once we manage to see 
the line drawing without seeing either of the figures, that we see the pic-
ture-rabbit as a line drawing? Seeing something as something else could 
indeed be taken as a symmetrical relationship that does not imply that 
one is the interpretation of what is ‘really seen’. This questions the sense 
of an epistemological hierarchy that I have thus far encouraged by using 
the value-laden image of verticality. Yet, it does not affect the orthogo-
nality of movements nor their connection to different temporalities. 
Even staying within three dimensions, one can have orthogonal move-
ments that are equally horizontal, and the paradigms that stabilize each 
of the horizontal movements can be in the same plane but orthogonal to 
each other. 
 In order to illustrate the exact reversal in scientific observation, 
Kuhn invokes an example of both reversible and irreversible movements 
within the history of science. These would seem to correspond, respec-
tively, to a period of crisis within one paradigm and to a revolutionary 
shift towards another paradigm: ‘if the scientist could switch back and 
forth like the subject of the gestalt experiments’ this would indicate a 
crisis, which Kuhn situates entirely in the old paradigm preceding a rev-
olutionary paradigm shift that resolves it: 
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The period during which light was ‘sometimes a wave and sometimes a 
particle’ was a period of crisis – a period when something was wrong – 
and it ended only with the development of wave mechanics and the reali-
zation that light was a self-consistent entity different from both waves and 
particles (p. 115).
This resolution of the wave–particle duality seems to relate precisely to 
learning to see the lines without seeing either of the figures, recognizing 
that one sees them alternately as a duck and as a rabbit. Again, this 
means associating a scientific revolution – the development of quantum 
mechanics, which is here invoked without being developed – with the 
dissolution or destruction of gestalten into something more elementary, 
rather than to the appearance of a new gestalt. 
 However, this is perhaps the most striking example of a multistable 
figure that is arguably irreducible and irresolvable because a shift of 
focus to an underlying object is barred. For it seems inaccurate to say 
that what one ‘really saw’ was light as ‘a self-consistent entity’ and that 
one saw it sometimes as a wave and sometimes as a particle. There is no 
raw data that is interpreted differently – if anything, there is something 
like the dawning of new aspects in the formalism of quantum mechan-
ics, be it in the guise of Schrödinger’s wave equation or in Heisenberg’s 
matrix formulation. While Kuhn seems to imply that seeing a wave or a 
particle was equally wrong – as light is an entity different from both – 
Niels Bohr’s principle of complementarity suggests that both percep-
tions have to be accepted as equally right and necessary for a complete 
description, even if they ‘stand in such a state of mutual exclusion that 
they cannot be visualized in a single picture’.51 In Bohr’s view it cannot 
be said what light really is, since it can only be seen under an aspect, 
and the aspect under which one decides to ‘see’ (or rather, measure) it 
determines what it is (Fig. 10).
Fig. 10. Complementarity.
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This is not the place to go into the details of the different interpretations 
of quantum mechanics, which continue to be subject to much debate. 
The point of engaging in some details with Kuhn’s analysis was not to 
re-evaluate its applicability to the history of science, but rather to illus-
trate how multistable figures with some small variations can provide a 
powerful and complex model to help identify and think through differ-
ent temporalities and topologies of decision-making. 
 As long as things are seen in only one way they are simply seen and 
there is no question of making a decision. Once another aspect dawns, 
the question arises as to whether one aspect is to be favoured over 
another – for being more accurate or in some other ways preferable, 
such as aesthetically, politically, morally, ethically, or religiously. Pro-
vided that the aspect changes are not fully involuntary, an unwitting 
decision – as the initial state of seeing is retroactively recognized – can 
thereby give way to a more reflective decision, for which one can seek 
to provide reasons and motivations. However, the model of multistable 
figures also allows for other possibilities. For instance, one could decide 
to keep the alternatives in suspense or continue to engage in reversible 
aspect changes, enjoying perhaps the aesthetic intensity or investing in 
the political potential of undecidability or of recurring aspect-dawnings. 
Furthermore, performing a shift in an orthogonal direction, one might 
see a common object in the different aspects and decide to focus all 
attention on it. The conflicting aspects may be regarded as epiphenom-
ena, as merely subjective, equally insufficient and ultimately wrong 
interpretations, and the choice between them could be considered as the 
result of a questionable ontology, epistemology, or ideology. Or, one 
might insist that the conflicting aspects are more elementary, cannot be 
combined into a single coherent object, and should be taken as the 
expression of an unmediated duality, a fundamental rupture, or ineluc-
table gap. Here, too, one might then decide to keep the alternatives in 
suspense rather than engage in one-sided reductions, but one might also 
take them as equally possible alternatives of actualization. While this 
brings us back to a decision between conflicting alternatives, they now 
stand for different actualizations of potentials on an ontological level, 
rather than for an object’s perceptual aspects on an epistemological 
level. While there is no reason to believe that any of these decisions can 
be taken once and for all, multistable figures provide a figure of thought 
that gives them a space and makes it possible to think them through in 
specific contexts. 
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